| 摘要: |
| 【目的】 从产品安全投入的角度，对食品供应链中的安全问题进行分析，为相关企业的产品安全投入决策提供参考。【方法】 根据博弈论、信息经济学的理论与方法，通过对食品供应链中企业的安全投入与收益间关系的分析，在恰当假设与简化的基础上，构建供应链中企业基于产品安全投入的非合作博弈模型、合作博弈模型与不完全信息博弈模型，对不同情况下企业的投入决策进行了分析。【结果】 利用构建的博弈模型，求出了非合作与合作两种情况下的均衡解及相关的比较结果，结合不完全信息这一事实，给出了供应链中企业产品安全投入的算式。【结论】 出于自身利益考虑，在非合作状态下，供应商和制造商也会进行安全投入，但由于社会虚度效应的存在，双方在非合作时的安全投入均低于合作时的安全投入。在更为符合实际情况的Bayesian均衡状态下，双方的安全投入水平与对方的合作概率成正比。 |
| 关键词: 食品供应链 安全投入 博弈论 |
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| Game analysis on product safety input of food supply chain |
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| Abstract: |
| 【Objective】 This paper analyzed the security issues in food supply chain from the perspective of product safety input,so as to provide scientific reference to input decision making on corporate product safety.【Method】 According to game theory as well as information economics,different game models,based on proper suppostion and simplification,were developed through the analysis of the relationshiop between safety input and profits.【Result】 It offered the co operation and non cooperative equilibrium solution and the related comparison results.Furthermore,the product safety input expression of supply chain enterprise was given in combination with incomplete information.【Conclusion】 The results show that suppliers and manufacturers in food supply chain,out of their own interests,will also conduct safety input in the non cooperative status.However,incomplete information causes lower safety input in the non cooperative status than that in the cooperative status.In the incomplete information situation,two sides of the safety input level are both proportional to the cooperation probability of the other party. |
| Key words: food supply chain safety input game theory |
